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I. INTRODUCTION
It bears mentioning that the blanket prohibition on the
admission of autopsy reports urged by defendant could result
in practical difficulties for murder prosecutions. If, for
example, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy
passes away before a perpetrator is apprehended and tried,
barring the use in evidence of the autopsy report could, in
some situations, effectively amount to a statute of limitations
on murder, where none otherwise exists.1
The forensic autopsy report is an important component of a
criminal homicide prosecution.2 The report, which is used to
memorialize the cause3 and manner of death4 under the auspices of a
coroner’s or medical examiner’s office,5 constitutes a significant
phase of a death investigation that is used “to (hopefully) convict the
guilty and exonerate the innocent.”6
1. People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428, 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
2. Medicolegal autopsies are conducted to determine the cause of death;
assist with the determination of the manner of death as natural, suicide, homicide,
or accident; collect medical evidence that may be useful for public health or the
courts; and develop information that may be useful for reconstructing how the
person received a fatal injury. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 248 (2009).
The autopsy is a post-mortem medical examination for studying the
pathologic changes present and determining the cause of death. The
autopsy includes three kinds of examinations: an inspection of the
external body; an examination and dissection of the internal organs and
vital structures; and a microscopic examination of selected tissues.
Cheryl M. Reichert & Virginia L. Kelly, Prognosis for the Autopsy, HEALTH AFF.,
May 1985, at 82, 82.
3. “The cause of death is the trauma, disease, or combination of conditions
that terminated the person’s life.” ANDRE A. MOENSSENS, BETTY LAYNE
DESPORTES & CARL N. EDWARDS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CASES § 14.09, at 666 (6th ed. 2013).
4. Manner of death may be characterized as “natural, accident, suicide,
homicide, and undetermined.” Id. § 14.10, at 666.
5. For an excellent description of the offices of the coroner and medical
examiner, including their roles and history, see generally Randy Hanzlick & Debra
Combs, Medical Examiner and Coroner Systems, 279 JAMA 870 (1998); Randy
Hanzlick, Medical Examiners, Coroners, and Public Health: A Review and
Update, 130 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 1274 (2006); Randy
Hanzlick, The Conversion of Coroner Systems to Medical Examiner Systems in the
United States: A Lull in the Action, 28 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 279
(2007).
6. MOENSSENS ET. AL., supra note 3, § 14.03, at 654. See also Reichart &
Kelly, supra note 2, at 85 (“The correlation of autopsy findings with criminal
investigations is an invaluable asset for a just society. Forensic autopsy findings
frequently implicate the guilty and vindicate the innocent.”). To demonstrate the
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The trial testimony of the pathologist7 and reference to the
pathologist’s forensic autopsy report implicate significant evidentiary
issues. First, the forensic autopsy report is a document prepared
subsequent to the autopsy, out of court, and is offered in court for the
truth of the matter it asserts. The examining pathologist is the out-ofcourt declarant. Therefore, the forensic autopsy report is classic
hearsay,8 which is inadmissible unless it fits within a recognized
exception to the hearsay rule.9 Typically, finding an applicable
exception is not a difficult obstacle to overcome, as forensic autopsy
reports may constitute business records10 (records of a regularly
conducted activity), public/official records,11 or may simply fall
within a state statutory hearsay exception created for the purpose of
the admission of forensic autopsy reports.12
The second evidentiary issue is far more complicated and requires
attention to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.13
The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;

potential significance of the forensic autopsy report in death investigations, “[i]n
2011, an estimated 14,612 persons were murdered in the United States.” FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2011 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/
crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/violent-crime/murdermain_final.pdf.
7. A “pathologist” is “[a] physician trained in the medical specialty of
pathology and the medical subspecialty of forensic pathology (the examination of
persons who die suddenly, unexpectedly, or violently).” MOENSSENS ET. AL.,
supra note 3, § 14.02, at 651.
Forensic pathology is the study of the diseases and injuries of the
community. Forensic pathologists have been described as detectives in
white coats. No other field of medicine supplies the intellectual
challenge of forensic pathology, as it requires a working knowledge of
diagnosis and treatment in every specialty of medicine plus an
understanding of such nonmedical fields as criminology, criminalistics,
engineering, highway design, police science, and political science.
Ronald K. Wright & Larry G. Tate, Forensic Pathology – Last Stronghold Of The
Autopsy, 1 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 57 (1980) (footnote omitted).
8. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c).
9. FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.
10. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
11. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
12. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-5.1 (West 2002).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.14
It is the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment that is of
particular relevance here.
The classic forensic pathology testimony at a criminal homicide
trial comes in one of two basic forms: (1) the examining
pathologist—the pathologist who performed the forensic autopsy on
the victim and prepared the autopsy report—is the in-court witness
who refers to the autopsy report, explains its findings and
conclusions, and is subject to cross-examination by the defendant15
or (2) the in-court witness is a “surrogate” pathologist, one who was
not the examining pathologist, from the office of the coroner or
medical examiner. The surrogate pathologist relies on the examining
pathologist’s autopsy report and offers a professional opinion at trial
as an expert witness.16 Here, the defendant is unable to confront and
cross-examine the examining pathologist. Yet, the prosecution may
seek to offer the autopsy report in evidence as the report, classic
hearsay,17 fits nicely within a recognized exception to the hearsay
rule.18
The second scenario has created the constitutional controversy
to which this Article is directed. Prior to the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Crawford v. Washington,19 the surrogate pathologist’s
reference to the autopsy report authored by the examining
pathologist and the admissibility of the autopsy report were
governed by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ohio v. Roberts.20 The
Court in Roberts pronounced that the Confrontation Clause did not
prohibit the admission of an unavailable witness’s statement against
a criminal defendant if the statement bore “adequate indicia of
reliability.”21 A hearsay statement made by an unavailable declarant
met the Roberts standard if it fell within a firmly rooted hearsay

14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Burr v. Lassiter, 513 F. App’x 327, 334, 337 (4th Cir. 2013);
People v. Avila, 208 P.3d 634, 647 (Cal. 2009); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604,
609 (Neb. 2003).
16. See People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Ill. 2012).
17. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c).
18. FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8); or applicable state statute pertaining to the
admissibility of forensic autopsy reports.
19. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
20. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S.
36.
21. Id. at 66.
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exception.22 The forensic autopsy report fit within a recognized
hearsay exception, and the evidentiary and constitutional problems
were avoided.23
Crawford v. Washington dramatically altered the Confrontation
Clause–hearsay landscape.24 In Crawford, the Supreme Court
pronounced that a recognized hearsay exception applicable to an
unavailable declarant does not trump the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause if the hearsay statement is “testimonial,” a
description suggesting that the statement has potential evidentiary
significance.25 This ruling has created a stir in the Supreme Court.
Despite the curious suggestion of one state supreme court,26 the
Supreme Court of the United States has not resolved the issue of
whether a forensic autopsy report is testimonial. There is a split
among the circuit courts of appeals and among state courts on this
topic.
This Article examines the landscape of legal issues involved in
determining whether the presence at trial of a surrogate pathologist,
whose testimony refers to a forensic autopsy report prepared by the
examining pathologist and provides the foundation for the
admissibility of the forensic autopsy report, implicates the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. This Article
concludes that the practice of surrogate testimony and admission of
the forensic autopsy report, well known and often required in
criminal homicide prosecutions, implicates and violates the
Confrontation Clause.
II. LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE FORENSIC AUTOPSY REPORT
A. Hearsay
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as follows:
(a) Statement. “Statement” means a person’s oral
assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if
the person intended it as an assertion.

22. Id. See also Ralph Ruebner & Timothy Scahill, Crawford v. Washington,
the Confrontation Clause, and Hearsay: A New Paradigm for Illinois Evidence
Law, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 703, 705 (2005).
23. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-5.1 (West 2002); FED. R. EVID.
803(6), (8).
24. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
25. Id. at 68.
26. State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009) (citing MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009)).
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(b)

Declarant. “Declarant” means the person who made
the statement.
(c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” means a statement that:
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at
the current trial or hearing; and
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement.27
When a party offers a forensic autopsy report into evidence at a
criminal homicide trial, hearsay becomes an issue. The forensic
autopsy report prepared by the examining forensic pathologist should
include two basic components: (1) the forensic autopsy findings28 and
(2) “the interpretations of the forensic pathologist including cause and
manner of death.”29 More specifically, the National Association of
Medical Examiners30 recommends that the forensic pathologist
undertake the following tasks in reporting autopsy results:
• prepare a written narrative report for each postmortem
examination;
• include the date, place, and time of examination;
• include the name of deceased, if known;
• include the case number;
• include observations of the external examination and,
when performed, the internal examination;
• include a separate section on injuries;
• include a description of internal and external injuries;
• include descriptions of findings in sufficient detail to
support diagnoses, opinions, and conclusions;
• include a list of the diagnoses and interpretations in
forensic autopsy reports;
• include cause of death;
• include manner of death;
• include the name and title of each forensic pathologist;
and
• sign and date each postmortem examination report.31
27. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c).
28. NAT’L ASS’N OF MED. EXAM’RS, FORENSIC AUTOPSY PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS 26 (2012), available at https://netforum.avectra.com/temp/Client
Images /NAME /eed6c85d-5871-4da1-aef3-abfc9bb80b92.pdf [hereinafter
NAME STANDARDS].
29. Id.
30. “[T]he national professional organization of physician medical
examiners.” About NAME, NAT’L ASS’N OF MED. EXAMINERS, https://netforum
.avectra.com/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=NAME&WebCode=AboutNAME
(last visited July 2, 2013).
31. NAME STANDARDS, supra note 28, at 26.
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Unquestionably, the forensic autopsy report contains a series of
assertive statements, prepared by an out-of-court declarant (the
forensic pathologist), and the report is then offered in evidence at
trial to prove the truth of the matters asserted in the report.
Therefore, the forensic autopsy report is hearsay.32
The next step in determining the admissibility of the forensic
autopsy report is to determine if it, as hearsay, fits within a
recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Federal Rules of Evidence
80333 and 804,34 state counterparts, and special state statutes provide
the hearsay exceptions. Insofar as the Federal Rules of Evidence are
concerned, Rule 803(6) provides as follows:
(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of
an act, event, condition, opinion or diagnosis if:
(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or
from information transmitted by—someone with
knowledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly
conducted activity of a business, organization,
occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that
activity;
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of
the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a
certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or
(12) or with a statute permitting certification; and
(E) neither the source of information nor the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of
trustworthiness.35
Rule 803(8) provides:
(8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office
if:
(A) it sets out:
(i) the office’s activities;
(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to
report, but not including, in a criminal case, a
matter observed by law-enforcement personnel;
or

32.
33.
34.
35.

FED. R. EVID. 801.
FED. R. EVID. 803.
FED. R. EVID. 804.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a
criminal case, factual findings from a legally
authorized investigation; and
(B) neither the source of information nor other
circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.36
Rule 803(6) encompasses the business records exception to the
hearsay rule,37 which federal circuit courts of appeals have applied
to forensic autopsy reports.38 Rule 803(8), the public records
exception, may also apply,39 and state courts have applied their own
counterparts.40
Further, some state statutes create an exception to the hearsay
rule for forensic autopsy reports, such as that in Illinois.41 The
Illinois statute is of particular interest insofar as it provides a hearsay
exception for the forensic autopsy report and contemplates the
testimony of a surrogate witness due to the death of the examining
pathologist. The Illinois statute provides as follows:
In any civil or criminal action the records of the coroner’s
medical or laboratory examiner summarizing and detailing
the performance of his or her official duties in performing
medical examinations upon deceased persons or autopsies,
or both, and kept in the ordinary course of business of the
coroner’s office, duly certified by the county coroner or
chief supervisory coroner’s pathologist or medical examiner,
shall be received as competent evidence in any court of this
State, to the extent permitted by this Section. These reports,
specifically including but not limited to the pathologist’s
protocol, autopsy reports and toxicological reports, shall be
public documents and thereby may be admissible as prima
facie evidence of the facts, findings, opinions, diagnoses and
conditions stated therein.
A duly certified coroner’s protocol or autopsy report, or
both, complying with the requirements of this Section may
be duly admitted into evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule as prima facie proof of the cause of death of the
person to whom it relates. The records referred to in this
Section shall be limited to the records of the results of post36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
See, e.g., United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006).
FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
Id. See People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ill. 2012).
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-5.1 (West 2002).
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mortem examinations of the findings of autopsy and
toxicological laboratory examinations.
Persons who prepare reports or records offered in evidence
hereunder may be subpoenaed as witnesses in civil or
criminal cases upon the request of either party to the cause.
However, if such person is dead, the county coroner or a
duly authorized official of the coroner’s office may testify to
the fact that the examining pathologist, toxicologist or other
medical or laboratory examiner is deceased and that the
offered report or record was prepared by such deceased
person. The witness must further attest that the medical
report or record was prepared in the ordinary and usual
course of the deceased person’s duty or employment in
conformity with the provisions of this Section.42
On the assumption that the forensic autopsy report neatly fits
within a recognized hearsay exception, the first legal issue of
hearsay has been resolved.43 However, in a criminal homicide
prosecution, the applicable hearsay exception does not end the quest
for admissibility. The Confrontation Clause provides the key
obstacle to admissibility and must be examined.44
B. The Confrontation Clause
1. Supreme Court Jurisprudence—Defining “Testimonial”
As previously mentioned, the admissibility of the forensic
autopsy report through the trial testimony of a surrogate forensic
pathologist was more than possible—it was likely—under the Ohio
v. Roberts standards.45 A hearsay statement made by an unavailable
declarant that fit within a firmly rooted hearsay exception did not
run afoul of the Confrontation Clause pursuant to Roberts.46
Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington and
changed the Confrontation Clause–hearsay landscape.47 Crawford

42. Id.
43. FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8). See also state law counterparts and state statutes
specifically providing for the admissibility of forensic autopsy reports.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
45. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
46. Id. at 66.
47. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
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was the first in a series of Supreme Court opinions48 to address the
concept of “testimonial” hearsay.49
a. Crawford v. Washington
In Crawford, the Supreme Court replaced Roberts as the
standard against which to measure the admission of classic hearsay
for a criminal prosecution when the out-of-court declarant was
unavailable for trial and cross-examination by the defendant. It was
in Crawford that the Supreme Court focused on the concept of
testimonial hearsay and the Confrontation Clause.50
Police arrested Crawford in Washington State for stabbing
Lee.51 Crawford and his wife searched for Lee on the belief that Lee
had previously attempted to rape his wife.52 Crawford and his wife
were taken into custody and separately interrogated.53
Crawford told the police of his belief that Lee was reaching for a
weapon when Crawford and Lee were fighting prior to the
stabbing.54 However, Crawford’s wife told a different story about
the fight—She did not believe that the victim had a weapon.55
Crawford was charged with assault and attempted murder.56 His
wife, a non-defendant, asserted the Washington State marital
privilege and did not testify at trial.57 The police recorded her
statement, and the prosecution offered it into evidence at Crawford’s
trial to refute his claim of self-defense.58 Her out-of-court statement
was obviously offered to prove its truth—that Crawford did not act
in self-defense and that the victim had no weapon. Therefore, the
statement of Crawford’s wife was classic hearsay. Crawford’s wife
admitted having assisted Crawford in finding the victim;59 therefore,
her statement qualified as a statement against interest, a well-known
exception to the hearsay rule applicable only when the out-of-court
48. Id. at 68–69; Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828–29 (2006);
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009); Michigan v. Bryant,
131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 (2011); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717
(2011); Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2243–44 (2012).
49. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 38.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 38–39.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 39–40.
56. Id. at 40.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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declarant is unavailable to testify at trial.60 Crawford’s wife, by
asserting the marital privilege, was “unavailable” under the
Washington State (and Federal) Rules of Evidence.
Crawford was convicted, but the court of appeals reversed,
holding that the out-of-court statement of Crawford’s wife did not
carry the required, particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.61
The Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Crawford’s
conviction.62 It held that while the statement of Crawford’s wife did
not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it did have
guarantees of trustworthiness because the statements of Crawford
and his wife were overlapping and interlocking.63
The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to determine whether the
State’s use of [the wife’s] statement violated the Confrontation
Clause.”64 The Crawford Court emphasized that the Confrontation
Clause applies to witnesses against the accused whose “statements . . .
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.”65 As a result, even a hearsay statement by an
unavailable declarant that fits within a recognized exception to the
hearsay rule may be inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment if the
defendant did not have a prior opportunity to confront and crossexamine the declarant.66
Therefore, under Crawford, it is essential to know the type or
quality of hearsay involved—Is it testimonial or not? Testimonial
hearsay will implicate the Sixth Amendment.67
Crawford provided insight to the identification of testimonial
hearsay. Testimonial hearsay includes:
• prior testimony;68
• depositions;69
• confessions;70
• affidavits;71
60. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
61. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41.
62. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 664 (Wash. 2002).
63. Id.
64. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
65. Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754961, at * 3).
66. Id. at 68.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J.
& Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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ex parte, in-court testimony;72
custodial police interrogations;73 and
pre-trial statements by declarants expected to be used
prosecutorially.74
Testimonial hearsay does not require actual testimony. There is,
however, an “official” character of testimonial hearsay.
Crawford did allude to a form of non-testimonial hearsay that
relates to the topic of this Article—business records, which by their
nature are not testimonial.75 Of course, Crawford did not consider
whether the forensic autopsy report was a business record.
Ultimately, this Article urges that a forensic autopsy report, even as
a business record, is testimonial, implicating the Confrontation
Clause.
•
•
•

b. Davis v. Washington
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis v. Washington also did
not address forensic autopsy reports.76 However, the Court’s
opinion was instructive regarding the definition of “testimonial.”
The Court focused on the issue of whether a domestic violence
victim’s statements in response to the interrogation of a 911 operator
were testimonial.77 Davis contributed the “primary purpose” test to
the analysis and characterization of testimonial statements.78 If the
primary purpose of the police interrogation aids an ongoing
emergency, then the statements are considered non-testimonial.79
However, if the purpose of the police interrogation is to establish
evidence relevant to a later criminal prosecution and there is no
ongoing emergency, then the statements are testimonial.80 Although
forensic autopsies and their reports may serve multiple purposes, it
is clear that they constitute important evidence in criminal
prosecutions.81

71. Id.
72. Id. at 51 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)).
73. Id.
74. Id. See also Ruebner & Scahill, supra note 22, at 715–21.
75. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
76. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
77. Id. at 817.
78. Id. at 822.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Maurice Levin, The Medicolegal Autopsy – Science Aids the Lawyer,
1964 INS. L.J. 274, 275 (1964).
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c. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, addressing the testimonial
nature of forensic certificates, involved the police detention and
search of a suspect yielding the seizure of white plastic bags
containing a substance resembling cocaine.82 Pursuant to
Massachusetts law, the police submitted the evidence to a state
laboratory for chemical analysis.83 The defendant was charged with
distributing and trafficking cocaine.84 At trial, the prosecution offered
and the court admitted into evidence certificates of forensic analysis
of the seized substances.85 The forensic analysis identified cocaine.86
The certificates were notarized and sworn to at the state laboratory.87
The actual analysts who performed the testing did not testify at
trial.88 The defendant was found guilty, and the conviction was
affirmed on appeal.89 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
denied further review, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.90
The Supreme Court held that the certificates constituted
testimonial statements.91 They were affidavits that were solemn
declarations created for the purpose of proving a fact.92 Here, the
purpose was to provide information regarding the analyzed
substance, which would lead one to believe that the certificate would
be available for use at a later trial. 93
The analysts who performed the forensic testing (but did not
testify) were witnesses against the defendant. The Supreme Court
noted that “[c]onfrontation is one means of assuring accurate
forensic analysis.”94 If the analysts lacked proper training or were
deficient in their judgment, these failings could be disclosed on
cross-examination.95
The Supreme Court referred to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6),
which provides a hearsay exception for records of a regularly
conducted activity (the business records exception).96 Here, the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308 (2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 320.
See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).

2013]

TESTIMONIAL AUTOPSY REPORTS

131

Supreme Court concluded that the forensic certificates did not
constitute business records insofar as the “regularly conducted
business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.”97
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court alluded to the
evidentiary status of “results of a coroner’s inquest” and “coroner’s
reports,” commenting that “whatever the status of coroner’s reports
at common law in England, they were not accorded any special
status in American practice.”98 Contrary to the suggestion of one
state court opinion,99 the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz did not
opine on the specifics of forensic autopsy reports. The Court did not
characterize the reports as business records, nor did the Court
determine if the reports constituted testimonial hearsay.
d. Michigan v. Bryant
Michigan v. Bryant is the next case in the series of Supreme
Court jurisprudence sounding in on the definition of “testimonial”
hearsay.100 It involved the conviction of the defendant for seconddegree murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony.101 The evidentiary
issue was the admissibility at trial of statements to the police by the
victim of a shooting; the victim was the out-of-court declarant for
hearsay purposes.102
In Bryant, the Supreme Court noted that Crawford v.
Washington103 left for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of “testimonial.”104 The primary
contribution of Bryant was to explain the non-testimonial nature of
the declarant’s statement as it related to an ongoing emergency.105
e. Bullcoming v. New Mexico
In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court considered the
testimonial nature of a laboratory report after the defendant was
convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol.106 A
97. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321.
98. Id. at 322.
99. State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009).
100. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).
101. Id.
102. FED. R. EVID. 801; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.
103. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
104. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1153.
105. Id. at 1167. This hearsay analysis is not involved in the discussion of
forensic autopsy reports and will not be pursued in this Article.
106. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709 (2011).
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laboratory analyst performed a blood alcohol analysis, prepared a
report, and signed a certification.107 However, at trial, this analyst
did not testify.108 A surrogate analyst, familiar with the forensic
laboratory reporting process, testified at trial.109 The laboratory
report certified that the defendant’s blood-alcohol concentration was
well above the limit for aggravated DWI.110
The Supreme Court held that surrogate trial testimony by the
analyst who did not participate in or observe the forensic testing
violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and that the
forensic laboratory report was testimonial.111 The Court stated that
the absence of an oath did not determine if the statement was
testimonial and that the laboratory report resembled those in
Melendez-Diaz. 112
With the Supreme Court opinions in Melendez-Diaz113 and
Bullcoming114 focusing on the testimonial nature of forensic data
analysis and forensic reports, one might reasonably predict that the
authors of forensic reports must anticipate the attempted
introduction of the reports in evidence and that the reports are
testimonial. The use of surrogate witnesses precludes a criminal
defendant from confronting and cross-examining the author of the
report and, necessarily, implicates the Confrontation Clause.
Crawford v. Washington made clear that a well-recognized hearsay
exception will not trump the Sixth Amendment when testimonial
hearsay is involved.115 Potential evidence developed through
forensic analysis has an “official” quality and, therefore, appears
testimonial. Before the predictive process becomes comfortable, this
Article must address Williams v. Illinois.116
f. Williams v. Illinois
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal
sexual assault, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping.117
The victim was abducted and raped.118 The police were called, the
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2717.
Id.; Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308–09 (2009).
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308–09.
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709.
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
Id. at 2231.
Id. at 2229.
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victim was taken to a hospital, and a sexual assault kit was
obtained.119 The kit was placed in the custody of the Chicago Police
and sent to the Illinois State Police Lab.120 At the lab, a forensic
scientist received the kit and analyzed the evidence, confirming the
presence of semen on vaginal swabs.121 The kit was resealed and
placed in an evidence freezer.122 The state lab then sent the vaginal
swabs to another lab, Cellmark, for DNA testing and produced a
male DNA profile.123 By this time, the defendant was not yet under
suspicion for rape.124
The state police lab undertook a computer search to determine if
the DNA profile matched entries in the Illinois State DNA
Database.125 There was a match with defendant’s blood obtained
from an earlier sample.126
Thereafter, the police conducted a lineup, and the victim
identified the defendant.127 The defendant was indicted and tried in a
bench trial.128 The Cellmark DNA report was not admitted in
evidence.129 A prosecution expert witness in forensic biology and
forensic DNA analysis (not the analyst who performed or observed
the tests) relied on the Cellmark DNA profile for her testimony.130
Remarkably, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that even if
the DNA report had been introduced in evidence, a Confrontation
Clause violation would not have resulted.131 It found that the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause refers to witnesses against an
accused, focusing on accusing a targeted individual along with
formalized statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, and confessions.132 The Supreme Court held that the
Cellmark report was not prepared for the primary purpose of
accusing a targeted individual.133 Nor was the purpose of the report
to accuse or create evidence at trial.134

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2230.
Id.
Id. at 2240.
Id. at 2242.
Id. at 2243.
Id.
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It should be noted that Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, refers
to the problem created by the inadmissibility of forensic autopsy
reports due to Confrontation Clause violations.135 He stated:
Autopsies, like the DNA report in this case, are often
conducted when it is not yet clear whether there is a
particular suspect or whether the facts found in the autopsy
will ultimately prove relevant in a criminal trial. Autopsies
are typically conducted soon after death. And when, say, a
victim’s body has decomposed, repetition of the autopsy
may not be possible. What is to happen if the medical
examiner dies before trial? Is the Confrontation Clause
effectively to function as a statute of limitations for
murder?136
Justice Breyer’s comments do not refer to the skill, judgment, and
subjectivity involved in the performance of the autopsy and
preparation of the autopsy report. These factors should play a
prominent role in the determination of the testimonial nature of
forensic autopsy reports.
Williams is a curious opinion in multiple respects. The Supreme
Court essentially dismissed the hearsay issue by focusing on expert
testimony.137 The expert testifying at trial was subject to crossexamination about the opinions offered at trial.138 The DNA profile
(the out-of-court statement), in the Supreme Court’s view, was not
offered in court for its truth but only to provide an explanation for
the expert’s opinions.139 This seems a contorted view of hearsay. If
the DNA report was untrue, why would an in-court expert rely on it?
That the defendant was not charged with a crime by the time the
forensic testing was undertaken really begs the question of the
testimonial nature of the DNA report. Any forensic scientist
undertaking testing that may result in the identification of a criminal
suspect must anticipate that the test results may constitute evidence
in a criminal prosecution.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals very recently made a
comment on the unsettling nature of the Williams opinion in United
States v. Maxwell.140 The Maxwell court noted that “the [Williams’s]
Court’s 4-1-4 division left no clear guidance about how exactly an
expert must phrase its testimony about the results of testing
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2228.
Id. at 2230.
Id. at 2239–40.
United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2013).
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performed by another analyst in order for the testimony to be
admissible.”141
State supreme court justices have not been shy in commenting
on the uncertainty and ambiguity of Supreme Court opinions
pertaining to forensic documents and the Confrontation Clause.142
How much formality is required for testimonial hearsay? Must a
primary evidentiary purpose completely overshadow other possible
purposes of a statement? Why is it not fair to conclude that the
authors of all forensic documentation in general, and autopsy reports
in specific, must anticipate that they will be introduced in evidence
in a criminal prosecution? A highly respected legal scholar
predicted, “[T]he Supreme Court will hold [another] round . . . in the
battle over the Confrontation Clause implications of forensic lab
reports.”143
What, then, is the fate of the forensic autopsy report prepared by
the examining pathologist but testified about by a surrogate
pathologist? Certainly, a forensic pathologist must anticipate that the
forensic autopsy report will constitute evidence. A forensic autopsy
report may be issued before a suspect is charged with homicide.
Should that fact impact the determination of the report as testimonial
or non-testimonial? In the absence of more cogent guidance by the
Supreme Court, it is necessary to examine the opinions of the circuit
courts of appeals and state courts that have addressed this issue.
III. POST-CRAWFORD JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF
APPEALS
This Section examines the jurisprudence of the circuit courts of
appeals. The purpose of this exercise is to use these opinions to
predict or forecast future action of the Supreme Court should it take
up the admissibility of forensic autopsy reports through the
testimony of surrogate forensic pathologists.
A. First Circuit
1. United States v. De La Cruz
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has
addressed the precise issue that is the subject of this Article. In
141. Id. at 727.
142. See Martin v. State, 60 A.3d 1100, 1102 (Del. 2013); People v. Lopez,
286 P.3d 469, 483 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., concurring).
143. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and Forensic Laboratory Reports,
Round Four, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 51, 82 (2012).
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United States v. De La Cruz, the defendant was convicted of drugrelated charges, including the distribution of heroin causing the drug
user’s death.144 At trial, an expert medical examiner testified for the
prosecution.145 He did not perform the autopsy on the victim.146 His
testimony relied on the autopsy report prepared by the examining
pathologist.147 Defendant objected to the testimony on
Confrontation Clause grounds, urging that the autopsy report was
testimonial.148
The court of appeals utilized a classic hearsay analysis and held
that the forensic autopsy report was a business record insofar as it
was “made in the ordinary course of business by a medical examiner
who is required by law to memorialize what he or she saw and did
during an autopsy.”149 The character of the forensic autopsy report,
the First Circuit concluded, “involves, in principal part, a careful and
contemporaneous reporting of a series of steps taken and facts found
by a medical examiner during an autopsy.”150 The court then relied
on Crawford v. Washington151 and opined that it excluded business
records from its “reach.”152 Consequently, the opinion of the court in
De La Cruz teaches that business records are not testimonial.153
Of course, De La Cruz does not address why certain business
records cannot be testimonial. It does not address whether the
examining forensic pathologist should anticipate that the autopsy
report would constitute trial evidence.
The real basis of the De La Cruz opinion may be the court of
appeals’s references to the post-Crawford New York state court
opinion in People v. Durio.154 There, the court, in finding an autopsy
report non-testimonial, focused on a practical problem encountered
in criminal prosecutions involving autopsies—the passage of time
contributing to the unavailability at trial of the examining
pathologist who performed the autopsy and prepared the forensic
autopsy report.155 The Durio court stated: “Certainly it would be
against society’s interests to permit the unavailability of the medical
144. United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 128 (1st Cir. 2008).
145. Id. at 131–32.
146. Id. at 132.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 132–33.
149. Id. at 133.
150. Id.
151. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
152. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56; De La Cruz, 514 F.3d at 133.
153. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d at 133.
154. People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), abrogated by
People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008).
155. Id. at 869.
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examiner who prepared the report to preclude the prosecution of a
homicide case.”156
The De La Cruz opinion is, therefore, one based on expediency
and practicality. The court was concerned about crippling criminal
prosecutions through the use of surrogate or expert forensic
pathology witnesses.157
To the extent that the vitality of De La Cruz is reliant on Durio,
that vitality may now be subject to question. In 2008, the Court of
Appeals of New York in People v. Rawlins rejected one of the
foundations of Durio, that documents encompassed by the business
record hearsay exception are not testimonial.158 Although Rawlins
did not concern forensic autopsy evidence, the court made clear that
it did not approve of a bright-line, non-testimonial characterization
of business records.159
2. Nardi v. Pepe
The First Circuit revisited the topic in 2011 in Nardi v. Pepe.160
In Nardi, the defendant was convicted of murder in Massachusetts,
and his conviction was affirmed in 2008,161 prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court opinions in Melendez-Diaz162 and Bullcoming.163
The U.S. district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, but it granted a certificate of appealability.164 Nardi appealed
to the First Circuit.165
Nardi was convicted of killing his mother.166 An autopsy was
performed, and the report “concluded that the cause of death was
consistent with asphyxia by suffocation.”167 The examining
pathologist had retired, suffered a medical condition, and could not
attend the trial.168 A surrogate pathologist, not involved in the
victim’s autopsy, testified at trial for the prosecution.169 After the
surrogate pathologist reviewed the autopsy report, he “testified to
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1027–28 n.8.
Id. at 1028.
Nardi v. Pepe, 662 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2011).
Id. at 108.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
Nardi, 662 F.3d at 110.
See generally id.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id.
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several facts derived from the autopsy report” and to the conclusion
of the examining pathologist that the victim was suffocated.170
On direct review of the conviction, the Supreme Judicial Court
(SJC) of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction and rejected the
Confrontation Clause claim.171 The SJC held that the testifying
pathologist appropriately offered his opinion, but insofar as he
revealed portions of the examining pathologist’s autopsy report, that
portion of the surrogate pathologist’s testimony did violate Nardi’s
Confrontation Clause rights.172
As to the petition for habeas corpus, the certificate of
appealability issued by the U.S. district court focused on this issue:
“whether it was clearly established law at the time of Nardi’s trial
that an autopsy report was inadmissible testimonial hearsay and, if
so, whether a testifying expert’s opinion may rely on inadmissible
[testimonial] hearsay.”173
The First Circuit held that Crawford174 “did not ‘clearly
establish’ that either the autopsy report or [the surrogate
pathologist’s] opinion in partial reliance upon it were inadmissible
under the Confrontation Clause.”175 The First Circuit discussed the
subsequent Supreme Court decisions in Melendez-Diaz176 and
Bullcoming,177 noted that autopsy reports could fit within either
analysis, and concluded that “it is uncertain how the [Supreme]
Court would resolve the question.”178 This uncertainty exists even
when using the “primary purpose test” emphasized in Bullcoming.179
Therefore, the First Circuit, holding that it could not resolve the
testimonial–non-testimonial dilemma through the application of
Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming, found that Crawford did
not bar the admissibility of the surrogate pathologist’s testimony and
the forensic autopsy report, affirmed Nardi’s conviction.180

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id. at 108; Commonwealth v. Nardi, 893 N.E.2d 1221 (Mass. 2008).
Nardi, 662 F.3d at 109–10.
Id. at 110 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Nardi, 662 F.3d at 110–11.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
Nardi, 662 F.3d at 111.
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716–17.
Nardi, 662 F.3d at 112.
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B. Second Circuit
1. United States v. Feliz
In United States v. Feliz, a post-Crawford, pre-Melendez-Diaz
and Bullcoming case, the Second Circuit considered a conviction
for, among other crimes, conspiring in the commission of murder in
aid of racketeering.181 “[T]o establish the manner and cause of
death,” the prosecution offered autopsy reports in evidence through a
surrogate medical examiner.182 The trial court admitted the autopsy
reports as business records.183
The Second Circuit rather easily dispatched the Confrontation
Clause issue, holding “that a statement properly admitted under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) cannot be testimonial because a
business record is fundamentally inconsistent with what the
Supreme Court has suggested comprise the defining characteristics
of testimonial evidence.”184 The court went to great lengths in
attempting to characterize a forensic medical examiner as a treating
physician whose record of patient treatment would not be composed
for use at trial.185 Further, even though a forensic pathologist may be
aware that his or her autopsy report “may be available for later use
at trial,” the Second Circuit concluded that forensic autopsy reports
constitute business records and are, therefore, non-testimonial.186
Additionally, the Second Circuit held that forensic autopsy reports
constitute records within the public records exception to the hearsay
rule187 and are non-testimonial.188
2. United States v. Burden
United States v. Burden did not involve a murder conviction or a
forensic autopsy.189 The Second Circuit, did, however, address the
definition of “testimonial statements.”190 In its opinion, the court

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 229 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 233–34.
Id. at 234–35.
Id. at 236.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
Feliz, 467 F.3d at 237.
United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 223.
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referred to its opinion in Feliz,191 which held that forensic autopsy
reports were not testimonial.192
3. Vega v. Walsh
Vega involved a request for federal habeas corpus relief from a
New York State murder conviction in 2002.193 By the time the
conviction was affirmed on appeal in the New York State court
system,194 Crawford195 had been decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court, but Melendez-Diaz196 and Bullcoming197 had not.198
Although a forensic autopsy report was not admitted in evidence
at trial, a surrogate medical examiner was allowed to testify about
the results of the autopsy.199 The testifying medical examiner did
state that, “the prosecution’s theory of [the victim’s] death . . . was
consistent with the autopsy results.”200 This testimony was the
subject of an issue raised by the habeas petition—Did the admission
of the surrogate medical examiner’s testimony violate the
defendant’s confrontation rights?201
The Second Circuit paid homage to its opinion in Feliz holding
“that autopsy reports are not testimonial and are admissible as public
and business records.”202 It noted that Crawford was the controlling
Supreme Court jurisprudence at the time the state court system
affirmed the defendant’s conviction and that the admission in
evidence of the surrogate’s testimony was permissible under
Crawford.203
The Second Circuit also noted that Crawford did not
exhaustively define or provide examples of testimonial
statements.204 The court was obliged to refer to non-prosecutorial
uses of forensic autopsy reports, presumably to rebut the argument
that the medical examiner can anticipate that an autopsy report will
constitute courtroom evidence.205
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.; Feliz, 467 F.3d at 235–36.
Burden, 600 F.3d at 225.
Vega v. Walsh, 669 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 2012).
People v. Vega, 805 N.Y.S.2d 642 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
Vega, 669 F.3d at 126−27.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 127−28.
Id. at 128.
Id.
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4. United States v. James
Most recently, in United States v. James, the Second Circuit
directly addressed the issues on which this Article focuses. Here, the
court considered the defendants’s convictions of multiple crimes,
including murder.206 A surrogate medical examiner testified at trial
regarding a forensic autopsy performed by another medical examiner,
and autopsy reports were admitted in evidence.207 The court reviewed
the post-Crawford208 Supreme Court jurisprudence—MelendezDiaz,209 Bullcoming,210 and Williams211—and held that forensic
autopsy reports are not testimonial “because they were not created
‘for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial.’” 212
The court reexamined its opinion in Feliz213 and its conclusions
therein, that autopsy reports were business records (exceptions to the
hearsay rule) pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) and
public records (exceptions to the hearsay rule) pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(8).214 It examined the post-Crawford215
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, in search of guidance in
defining “testimonial.” The court found no assistance in the
Williams216 plurality opinion regarding the “primary purpose”
test.217
How, then, did the James court conclude that the forensic
autopsy report was non-testimonial? The court examined “the
particular relationship between the Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner (OCME) and law enforcement both generally and in this
particular case.”218 It noted that the victim’s autopsy was completed,
and the autopsy report was prepared “before any criminal
investigation into [the victim’s] death had begun.”219 In the court’s
opinion, the medical examiner did not expect a resulting criminal
investigation. The autopsy report “was not prepared primarily to
create a record for use at a criminal trial.”220
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 87.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2011).
James, 712 F.3d at 88 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324).
United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006).
James, 712 F.3d at 89.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221.
James, 712 F.3d at 95−96.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 99.
Id.
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A final point should be made about the James majority opinion.
It referred to the victim’s autopsy as “routine.”221 This
characterization merits later comment as this Article urges that
forensic autopsy reports are testimonial (and not routine).
The concurring opinion takes exception with the holding that the
forensic autopsy report was non-testimonial.222 The concurrence
distills the Supreme Court jurisprudence and identifies “three key
considerations for determining if a statement is testimonial” as
follows:223
(1) “Testimony is a solemn declaration or affirmation made
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”224
(2) “[T]he statement must have been made in a way that is
sufficiently solemn so as to make it more like ‘a formal
statement to government officers’ rather than ‘a casual
remark to an acquaintance.’”225
(3) “[T]he statement must reasonably be understood as
being ‘available for use at a later trial.’”226
The concurrence applied these considerations and easily found
that they were satisfied.227 The forensic autopsy report was “created
to establish facts regarding the death of [the victim],” including
components pertaining to forensic description, analysis, and cause of
death.228 Next, the forensic autopsy report was “sufficiently solemn”
as it was created pursuant to applicable law.229 Lastly, the findings
of the autopsy report, including that the victim may have been
poisoned, would lead “a reasonable medical examiner [to anticipate]
that the autopsy report could be used prosecutorially.”230
Two additional points raised by the concurrence merit comment.
First, the forensic autopsy report, when admitted in evidence,
functions as a witness at trial.231 Next, referring to the Eleventh
Circuit opinion in Ignasiak,232 the concurrence emphasized that the
forensic autopsy report is “the product of the skill, methodology,
and judgment of the highly trained examiner[] who actually
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id. at 108 (Eaton, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
Id. at 109 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1153 (2011)).
Id. (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009)).
Id. at 109−10.
Id.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2012).
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performed the autopsy.”233 This speaks against the concept of a
routine autopsy and a report that merely communicates objective
data. As this Article will later show, this attribute of the forensic
autopsy report may be the most significant in implicating the
Confrontation Clause.234
C. Sixth Circuit
In Mitchell v. Kelly, a recent per curiam, unpublished
disposition, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered the
admissibility of a forensic autopsy report and the testimony of a
surrogate coroner’s physician.235 A jury convicted Mitchell of
murder and other crimes in 2005 in the Ohio State court system.236
His petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied, and “[t]he
district court granted Mitchell a certificate of appealability regarding
his Confrontation Clause claim.”237
The procedure at trial was a familiar one. A surrogate
pathologist testified, and the forensic autopsy report was admitted in
evidence as a business record.238 In disposing of the habeas petition,
“the district court determined that the state courts did not
unreasonably refuse to extend Crawford v. Washington, to exclude
the autopsy report admitted at Mitchell’s trial.”239
The Mitchell court made clear that under Ohio law, “autopsy
reports are admissible as nontestimonial business records.”240 The
Sixth Circuit correctly noted “the lack of Supreme Court precedent
establishing that an autopsy report is testimonial.”241

233. James, 712 F.3d at 111 (Eaton, J., concurring) (quoting Ignasiak, 667
F.3d at 1232).
234. See infra Part V.
235. Mitchell v. Kelly, 520 F. App’x 329, 330 (6th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. (citation omitted).
240. Id. at 331.
241. Id.
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D. Ninth Circuit
In McNeiece v. Lattimore, an unpublished disposition of a
habeas petition, the Ninth Circuit considered a Confrontation Clause
claim stemming from a pre-Melendez-Diaz242 and Bullcoming243
conviction.244 Here, “excerpts of an autopsy report showing a
diagram of the victim’s body with descriptions of the bullet
wounds” were admitted in evidence pursuant to the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.245 The court permitted a surrogate
pathologist to testify to his “own opinions” based on the autopsy
report.246 On appeal, the state appellate court held the autopsy report
“non-testimonial” pursuant to Crawford.247
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit’s review revealed that these
evidentiary determinations were not contrary to Crawford248 or
Davis,249 the Supreme Court jurisprudence available as of the time
of the underlying conviction.250 Further, the Ninth Circuit was not
impressed with the fact that law enforcement personnel attended the
victim’s autopsy.251 Of course, the attendance at forensic autopsies
by law enforcement personnel contributes to the awareness of the
examining pathologist that the autopsy report is likely to constitute
evidence at a criminal prosecution.
E. Tenth Circuit
In United States v. MacKay, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit considered the appeal from the physician–
defendant’s conviction of unlawfully prescribing controlled
substances.252 One of the issues on appeal concerned the
admissibility of an autopsy report resulting from the autopsy of one
of the defendant’s patients.253
The physician who performed the autopsy and prepared the
autopsy report died before trial.254 The prosecution introduced the
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
McNeiece v. Lattimore, 501 F. App’x 634 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 636.
Id.
Id.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
McNeiece, 501 F. App’x at 636.
Id.
United States v. MacKay, 715 F.3d 807, 812–13 (10th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 830.
Id. at 826.
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report in evidence.255 The Chief Medical Examiner, the surrogate,
testified at trial as to the cause of death.256 A toxicologist who had
reviewed the autopsy report also testified as to the mechanism of
death, as did a defense expert.257 In referring to the autopsy report,
the Tenth Circuit stated that “Dr. Frikke, the doctor who performed
the autopsy, ‘certified that the death was due to drug toxicity
poisoning with hydrocodone and oxycodone.’”258 On appeal, the
defendant “argue[d] the autopsy report’s admission into evidence
present[ed] a Confrontation Clause issue.”259
The Government argued that the defendant did not preserve the
Confrontation Clause issue for review by his failure to object at
trial.260 The defendant urged that the law changed post-conviction
due to Bullcoming and Ignasiak.261 However, the Tenth Circuit
noted that Bullcoming pre-dated defendant’s conviction, and he
could have objected to the admission of the autopsy report based on
Bullcoming.262 Additionally, the court noted that defendant was
unable to prove that the trial court committed plain error in
admitting the autopsy report.263 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit simply
did not reach the evidentiary and constitutional issues in MacKay.264
F. Eleventh Circuit
In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit decided United States v. Ignasiak,
an appeal from the defendant’s conviction of health care fraud and
illegally prescribing controlled substances in violation of the
Controlled Substances Act.265 The defendant was a medical doctor
who allegedly “prescribed unnecessary or excessive quantities of
controlled substances without a legitimate medical purpose and
‘outside the usual course of professional practice.’”266 Patients of the
defendant died allegedly as a result of the defendant’s conduct.267
Autopsies were performed and reports were prepared, but the
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 829 (citation omitted).
259. Id. at 831.
260. Id.
261. Id. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); United States
v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2012).
262. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705.
263. MacKay, 715 F.3d at 832.
264. Id.
265. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1217, 1219.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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examining pathologists did not testify at trial.268 The trial court
admitted into evidence the autopsy reports and testimony about the
reports.269 There was no evidence to suggest that “the coroners who
performed the autopsies were unavailable and the accused had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine them.”270 Therefore, the court
was faced with the classic case of the surrogate medical examiner
witness at trial.271
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the autopsy reports were
admitted in evidence as business records.272 The court reviewed
Crawford,273 Melendez-Diaz,274 and Bullcoming275 and concluded
that forensic autopsy reports are testimonial, implicating the
Confrontation Clause.276 It referred to state court opinions on both
sides of this issue and the Second Circuit opinion in Feliz.277 The
Ignasiak court easily dispensed with Feliz as a pre-Melendez-Diaz
opinion, stating that Feliz “has little persuasive value on this
issue.”278 Further, it found that the forensic autopsy reports “were
prepared ‘for use at trial,’” referring to Florida law pertaining to the
office and responsibilities of medical examiners in the state.279 They
were “made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.”280 Therefore, these reports were
testimonial.281
Significantly, the Ignasiak court referred to the “medical–legal”
justification for the defendant’s need to confront and cross-examine
the pathologist who performs a forensic autopsy.282 It is only
through confrontation and cross-examination that the defendant may
explore a forensic pathologist’s skill and judgment.283 In this regard,
the forensic pathologist is similar to the physician who provides care
to the living based on the physician’s education, training,
268. Id. at 1220.
269. Id. at 1229.
270. Id. at 1220.
271. Id. at 1229.
272. Id.
273. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
274. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
275. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
276. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1231−32.
277. United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006). See supra Part III.B.1.
278. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1231 n.15.
279. Id. at 1231.
280. Id. at 1232 (quoting United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1203 (11th
Cir. 2005)).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1232−33.
283. Id.
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experience, skill, and judgment. The court in Ignasiak recognized
that “autopsy reports are like many other types of forensic evidence
used in criminal prosecutions.”284 The report “may be invalid or
unreliable because of the examiner’s errors, omissions, mistakes, or
bias.”285 This insight critically addresses the thought that forensic
autopsy reports simply collect objective data and that all
pathologists would routinely replicate findings contained in the
report. Surrogate pathology witnesses cannot be effectively crossexamined regarding the findings of the examining pathologists.
Surely, this is a compelling Confrontation Clause position.
G. District of Columbia Circuit
In United States v. Moore,286 the defendants were convicted of
multiple crimes, including murder.287 Admitted in evidence were
“autopsy reports authored by the Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner of the District of Columbia.”288 The author of the reports
was unavailable to testify.289 The surrogate witness was the chief of
the medical examiner’s office, who “neither performed nor observed
the autopsies and his signature [did] not appear on any of the
reports.”290
The D.C. Circuit noted that the application of the Confrontation
Clause to the admissibility of forensic autopsy reports through a
surrogate witness “is a question left open in Bullcoming.”291 After
addressing the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the topic, the court
held that the forensic autopsy reports were testimonial.292 The
relevant factors were: the statutory obligation of the medical
examiner to investigate deaths; the presence of law enforcement
officers at the autopsies; the participation of law enforcement
officers in the creation of reports related to the autopsies; and “each
autopsy found the manner of death to be a homicide caused by
gunshot wounds.”293 Consequently, the court found that these
“circumstances . . . would lead an objective witness reasonably to

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 1233.
Id.
United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Id. at 39.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73.
Id.
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believe that the [autopsy reports] would be available for use at a
later trial.”294
To date, the circuit courts of appeals are split on the testimonial
nature of forensic autopsy reports offered in evidence through
surrogate witnesses. The First, Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
have held these reports to be “non-testimonial” and admissible.295
The Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have held these reports to be
“testimonial,” implicating the Confrontation Clause.296 In an effort
to explore a more complete jurisprudential landscape, a survey of
state court opinions will be examined.
IV. POST-CRAWFORD JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE STATES
A. States Holding Forensic Autopsy Reports to be Testimonial
1. Massachusetts
In 2009, the SJC of Massachusetts addressed the admissibility of
a surrogate medical examiner’s in-court testimony in Commonwealth
v. Avila.297 The examining pathologist (who conducted the autopsy)
was not employed by Massachusetts at the time of trial.298 At trial, the
surrogate medical examiner offered opinions on the cause and manner
of death, how long it took the victim to die, and “whether the victim
might have been conscious after each shot was fired.”299 The
surrogate’s in-court testimony was based upon the examining
pathologist’s autopsy report and diagram.300 The diagram was
admitted into evidence, but the autopsy report was not. Despite this
fact, the Avila court stated that “the substitute medical examiner, as an
expert witness, is not permitted on direct examination to recite or
otherwise testify about the underlying factual findings of the
unavailable medical examiner as contained in the autopsy report.”301
The testimony of the surrogate medical examiner, in this regard,
violated the Confrontation Clause.302
In 2013, the SJC of Massachusetts reaffirmed this position in
Commonwealth v. Reavis.303 Here, the attending medical examiner
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009)).
See supra Parts III.A–E.
See supra Parts III.F, G.
Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1027 (Mass. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1029.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Reavis, 992 N.E.2d 304 (Mass. 2013).
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was unavailable for trial. A surrogate medical examiner testified and
opined on the cause of death, based upon “his review of the autopsy
report, the toxicology report, and the autopsy photographs.”304 The
SJC approved this trial strategy while apparently maintaining its
position in Avila.305 In this regard, the court stated that, “[a]
substitute medical examiner may not, however, testify to facts in the
underlying autopsy report where that report has not been
admitted.”306 It is possible that the phrase “where that report has not
been admitted” may have been a judicial slip of the tongue,
particularly if Avila intended to teach that forensic autopsy reports
are testimonial.307 It is also possible that the Reavis court was
contemplating a situation in which the defendant did not object to
the admission in evidence of the report.308
Avila and Reavis, therefore, at least suggest that the forensic
autopsy report constitutes testimonial hearsay. Insofar as the court’s
opinions approved of the surrogate’s in-court opinion testimony,309
Massachusetts could adopt a variant of the hybrid approach to the
admissibility of forensic autopsy reports, an approach to be
discussed later in this Article.310
2. Michigan
As a result of recent involvement of the Supreme Court of
Michigan, it may be reasonable to place Michigan in the
“testimonial column.” In 2010, the Court of Appeals of Michigan in
People v. Lewis proclaimed that a forensic autopsy report was
admissible as non-testimonial despite the admission of the report
through a surrogate medical examiner.311 The court held that the
autopsy report was prepared pursuant to a statutory requirement,
“was not prepared primarily for use in a later criminal prosecution,”
and the surrogate was subject to cross-examination regarding his
opinions, which were based on the autopsy report.312 This was the
recipe for a non-testimonial autopsy report.
304. Id. at 311.
305. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014.
306. Reavis, 992 N.E.2d at 312.
307. See Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014.
308. See Reavis, 992 N.E.2d 304.
309. Id. at 312.
310. This approach, which will be discussed later, permits the admissibility of
the “objective data” contained in the autopsy report—anatomical findings—and
excludes the examining pathologist’s opinions on cause and manner of death. See
infra Part IV.C.
311. People v. Lewis, 788 N.W.2d 461, 466–67 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010), aff’g
judgment, vacating in part, People v. Lewis, 806 N.W.2d 295 (Mich. 2011).
312. Id.

150

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

In 2011, the Supreme Court of Michigan issued an order in
Lewis affirming the result but vacating “that part of the . . . opinion
holding that the autopsy report was not testimonial and, therefore,
that its admission did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”313 The
supreme court disagreed with the court of appeals application of a
Michigan rule of evidence “and its determination that the autopsy
report was not prepared in anticipation of litigation.”314 The court of
appeals opinion was affirmed as the supreme court agreed “that the
admission of the [autopsy] report was not outcome
determinative.”315
Of special interest is the concurrence contained in the order,
which urges that the supreme court’s order did not decide “whether
the autopsy report constituted testimonial hearsay evidence.”316 The
concurring judge preferred that the supreme court directly address
this issue.317
Notwithstanding the concurrence, the Supreme Court of
Michigan’s order in Lewis suggests that it was troubled by the
characterization of the autopsy report as non-testimonial. Therefore,
with caution, it seems fair to urge that Michigan has become another
jurisdiction to recognize the testimonial nature of forensic autopsy
reports.
3. Missouri
In 2007, a Missouri court of appeals addressed the precise issue
in State v. Davidson.318 Here, a surrogate medical examiner testified
at trial. The examining physician did not testify at trial “because she
was ‘out of town on vacation or something.’”319 The victim’s
autopsy report was admitted in evidence.320 The Davidson court
referred to the state’s pre-Crawford practice of admitting forensic
autopsy reports in evidence under the business records exception to
the hearsay rule.321 Post-Crawford, however, the court held that the
forensic autopsy report issued in the prosecution was testimonial.322
It was prepared “at the request of law enforcement in anticipation of
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Lewis, 806 N.W.2d at 295.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. (Kelly, J., concurring).
Id.
State v. Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 417.
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a murder prosecution, and the report was offered to prove the
victim’s cause of death.”323 The court then pronounced, “[w]hen an
autopsy report is prepared for purposes of criminal prosecution, as
this one was, the report is testimonial.”324
4. New Mexico
The evidentiary character of forensic autopsy reports has been
the subject of two recent cases: State v. Jaramillo325 and State v.
Navarette.326
a. State v. Jaramillo
In Jaramillo, which involved a prosecution for child abuse
resulting in death, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy
was no longer employed by the medical examiner’s office at the
time of trial.327 He demanded a large fee to testify at trial that the
State would not pay.328 A surrogate medical examiner testified at
trial “to establish the cause and manner of [the victim’s] death.”329
He “read directly from the autopsy report” and “testified to . . .
specific observations and notations made during the autopsy.”330
The autopsy report was admitted in evidence.331
Referring to New Mexico case law, the Jaramillo court noted
the testimonial nature of a forensic report that was based on “an
exercise of judgment and analysis” and attributed this quality to the
autopsy report.332 The court also found that “the autopsy report was
prepared with the purpose of preserving evidence for criminal
litigation” as it “was made with the intention of the medical
examiner to establish the cause and manner of . . . death,” additional
characteristics of a testimonial statement.333 Further, the Jaramillo
court acknowledged the need for cross-examination of the
examining pathologist, noting that “cross-examination is necessary
to explore the boundaries of the expert’s qualifications and correct

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id.
Id.
State v. Jaramillo, 272 P.3d 682 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435 (N.M. 2013).
Jaramillo, 272 P.3d 682, 684.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 685–86.
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application of scientific techniques and methods.”334 As previously
mentioned, the pathologist who performed the forensic autopsy is no
different than the physician who examined and treated a patient.
Each relies on experience, training, skill, and judgment, the
application of which can only be explored at trial through crossexamination.
b. State v. Navarette
In 2013, in State v. Navarette, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico followed Jaramillo and held that forensic autopsy reports
are testimonial.335 Significantly, the Navarette court, in reliance on
Bullcoming,336 stated “that when determining whether an out-ofcourt statement is testimonial, there is no meaningful distinction
between factual observations and conclusions requiring skill and
judgment.”337 This pronouncement discounts the argument made by
the proponents of admissibility, that forensic autopsy reports contain
objective data, presumably of the type that would be reported in a
similar fashion by any forensic pathologist. This position, rejected in
New Mexico, would authorize a surrogate pathologist to testify
because the surrogate would simply testify regarding objective
autopsy findings and the surrogate’s “opinions” would be subject to
cross-examination.
5. North Carolina
In State v. Locklear, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, with
guidance supplied by Melendez-Diaz,338 held that forensic autopsy
reports admitted in evidence through a surrogate medical examiner
were testimonial.339 Curiously, the Locklear court suggested that the
testimonial nature of forensic autopsy reports was recognized by
Melendez-Diaz.340 To be sure, Melendez-Diaz, in a footnote, referred
to the importance of confrontation, presumably to challenge
“forensic analyses, such as autopsies.”341 It did not, however,
conclude that forensic autopsy reports are testimonial, the admission
into evidence of which violates the Confrontation Clause when the
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. at 687.
State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 441 (N.M. 2013).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
Navarette, 294 P.3d at 438 (emphasis added).
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 305 (N.C. 2009).
Id. at 304–05.
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318 n.5.
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defendant had no prior opportunity to confront and cross-examine
the examining pathologist.
6. Oklahoma
In 2010, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in CuestaRodriguez v. State held that a forensic autopsy report was
testimonial.342 Here, the medical examiner who performed the
autopsy and prepared the autopsy report had retired by the time of
trial.343 A surrogate, the Chief Medical Examiner, testified at trial.344
The surrogate “testified regarding the examination of the body
conducted by [the medical examiner who performed the autopsy]
and gave his own opinions on [the victim’s] injuries and cause of
death based on . . . observations as recorded in [the] autopsy
report.”345 The prosecution urged the admission of the autopsy
report as a business record, the preparation of which the statute
required for multiple possible purposes.346
The Cuesta-Rodriguez court examined the statutory
responsibilities of the medical examiner and held that a medical
examiner must anticipate that a forensic “autopsy report involving a
violent or suspicious death . . . should reasonably [be] expect[ed] to
be used in a criminal prosecution.”347 The report would constitute
testimonial evidence pursuant to Crawford and Melendez-Diaz.
Cuesta-Rodriguez also addressed the issue of whether a
surrogate witness may use the contents of an otherwise testimonial
forensic autopsy report as the basis of trial opinion testimony when
the autopsy report is not introduced in evidence.348 The answer is
no. Applicable “evidence rules cannot trump the Sixth Amendments
right of confrontation.”349 Therefore, a surrogate pathology witness,
qualified as an expert, cannot base his or her trial opinions on
evidence that would violate the Confrontation Clause due to its
testimonial nature.350

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Cuesta-Rodriguez v. State, 241 P.3d 214, 229 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010).
Id. at 226.
Id.
Id. at 226–27.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id.
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7. Texas
The appellate courts of Texas have twice recently pronounced
the testimonial nature of forensic autopsy reports in cases involving
the in-court testimony of surrogate medical examiners in which the
reports were not offered into evidence.351 The courts sent mixed
messages, however, as to whether a surrogate witness may base incourt opinions on the review of testimonial autopsy reports.
a. Martinez v. State
In 2010, in Martinez v. State, a Texas court determined that the
forensic autopsy report was testimonial.352 Here, a police “officer
attended the autopsy and took photographs of the body.”353 The
medical examiner could reasonably assume “that his autopsy report
would be used prosecutorially.”354 Additionally, the court adeptly
noted that the content of the autopsy report would support the
opinions of the surrogate medical examiner only if the content was
true and that this “use of testimonial statements” would offend the
Confrontation Clause.355
b. Wood v. State
In 2009, in Wood v. State, a surrogate medical examiner
provided in-court testimony.356 “The homicide detective who was
the lead investigator in this case and a police evidence specialist
attended the autopsy.”357 The court had no difficulty finding that the
medical examiner who performed the autopsy “understood that the
report containing her findings and opinions would be used
prosecutorially.”358
Curiously, the Wood court engaged in a tedious analysis as to
whether the surrogate medical examiner could base his in-court
opinions on a testimonial forensic autopsy report. First, the court
held that “the Confrontation Clause was not offended when [the
surrogate] testified to his own opinions regarding the nature and
causes of [the victim’s] injuries and death, even though those
351. Martinez v. State, 311 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010); Wood v. State,
299 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).
352. Martinez, 311 S.W.3d at 111.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 112.
356. Wood v. State, 299 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).
357. Id. at 210.
358. Id.
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opinions were based in part on [the surrogate’s] review of [the]
autopsy report.”359 Of course, this approach ignores the “house of
cards” character of this form of opinion testimony. But then the
Wood court noted that the surrogate “did more than merely offer his
expert opinions. He also disclosed to the jury the testimonial
statements in the autopsy report on which his opinions were
based.”360 Because the contents of the forensic autopsy report only
supported the surrogate’s in-court opinions if the contents were true,
the disclosure of the forensic autopsy report contents violated the
Confrontation Clause.361
Frankly, it seems that the Wood court has recognized a
distinction without a difference. The Confrontation Clause is no less
involved when a surrogate medical examiner testifies to opinions
based upon a testimonial forensic autopsy report than when the same
witness discloses to the jury the specific findings contained in the
report. In either case, the otherwise inadmissible report, testimonial
in nature, informs the in-court opinion testimony solely due to its
presumptive truth. Therefore, in either case, the forensic autopsy
report as a testimonial statement is inadmissible as violative of the
Confrontation Clause, and the surrogate’s opinions based on the
report should be inadmissible as well.
8. West Virginia
In 2012, in State v. Kennedy, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals addressed the classic scenario: a murder prosecution, an
autopsy, an autopsy report prepared by the examining pathologist, a
surrogate pathologist providing in-court testimony, and the autopsy
report admitted in evidence.362 The surrogate pathologist also
“offered testimony regarding the general methodology of
performing autopsies.”363
After reviewing relevant jurisprudence and noting the primary
purpose of the autopsy report, the Kennedy court concluded “that,
for purposes of use in criminal prosecutions, autopsy reports are
under all circumstances testimonial.”364 Further, the court held that
because a West Virginia statute365

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 213.
Id.
Id.
State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 2012).
Id. at 910.
Id. at 917.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-12-13 (Westlaw 2013).
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compels the mandatory admission of an autopsy report or
other testimonial document, in a criminal action, where the
performing pathologist or analyst does not appear at trial and
the State fails to establish that the pathologist or analyst is
unavailable and that the accused has had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the witness, [the statute] is unconstitutional
and unenforceable.366
B. States Holding Forensic Autopsy Reports to be Non-Testimonial
1. Arizona
Quite recently, in State v. Medina, the Supreme Court of
Arizona considered an automatic appeal from a murder conviction
and death sentence.367 At issue on appeal was the admissibility of
the forensic autopsy report, prepared by the examining pathologist,
and the in-court testimony of a surrogate pathologist “who testified
concerning the report’s conclusions and used the report and
photographs of the body to make various independent conclusions
about the death.”368
The Supreme Court of Arizona correctly noted that “[t]he United
States Supreme Court ha[d] not determined whether an autopsy
report is testimonial.”369 In referring to U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence and its primary purpose and solemnity tests,370 the
court concluded that neither test was particularly helpful. The court
pronounced, “[T]here is no binding rule for determining when
reports are testimonial.”371
Despite its recognition that neither the primary purpose nor
solemnity tests were binding, the court applied both tests and
concluded that the forensic autopsy report was not testimonial.372
The purpose of the report “was not primarily to accuse a specified

366. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d at 917.
367. State v. Medina, 306 P.3d 48, 55 (Ariz. 2013).
368. Id. at 62.
369. Id. at 63.
370. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). The plurality opinion noted
the abuses that trigger the right to confrontation include “out-of-court statements
having the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in
criminal conduct . . . .” Id. at 2242. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas argued the
right to confrontation exists only when material is sufficiently solemn. Id. at 2259–
60 (Thomas, J., concurring). The solemnity standard refers to the dignity of an
affidavit. Id. at 2260.
371. Medina, 306 P.3d at 63.
372. Id. at 63–64.
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individual” and was neither certified nor arose “from formal
dialogue akin to custodial interrogation.”373
Finally, the court had no problem with the in-court testimony of
the surrogate pathologist. The in-court testimony revealed the
surrogate’s “independent conclusions” and did not violate the
Confrontation Clause under Arizona law.374
2. California
In People v. Dungo, the Supreme Court of California considered
the in-court testimony of a surrogate pathologist–expert who opined
on the cause of the victim’s death.375 The forensic autopsy report
was not introduced in evidence.376 The surrogate pathology witness
did not describe the victim’s cause of death as specified in the
forensic autopsy report.377 The surrogate witness did describe the
condition of the victim’s body based the surrogate’s review of the
forensic autopsy report and autopsy photographs.378 Therefore, the
forensic autopsy report informed the in-court opinions of the
surrogate.
Comparing the statements in the autopsy report, “describing the
pathologist’s anatomical and physiological observations about the
condition of the body” to “observations of objective fact in a report
by a physician who, after examining a patient, diagnoses a particular
injury or ailment and determines the appropriate treatment,” the
Dungo court, guided by Melendez-Diaz,379 held those statements
non-testimonial.380
The Dungo court determined that “criminal investigation was
not the primary purpose for the autopsy report’s description of the
condition of [the victim’s] body; it was only one of several
purposes” based on California law.381 The court adhered to this
position even though a detective was present at the autopsy.382
Consequently, in Dungo, the court did not find the necessary
formality or primary purpose of the forensic autopsy report to
implicate the defendant’s right of confrontation.383
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
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People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442 (Cal. 2012).
Id. at 444.
Id. at 444−46.
Id. at 444.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
Dungo, 286 P.3d at 449.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 450.

158

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

3. Florida
Banmah v. State384 concerned a murder and armed robbery
prosecution in which a surrogate medical examiner testified about
the autopsy findings of the medical examiner who performed the
autopsy, a practice permitted by Florida case law.385 Without even a
reference to U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Banmah court
held that “autopsy reports are non-testimonial because they are
prepared pursuant to a statutory duty, and not solely for use in
prosecution.”386
4. Illinois
a. People v. Leach
In 2012, in People v. Leach, the Supreme Court of Illinois
addressed both aspects of the forensic autopsy evidentiary
problem—the admission in evidence of the forensic autopsy report
and the opinion testimony of a surrogate forensic pathologist.387
Leach involved a murder conviction.388 At trial, the defendant
moved in limine to prevent trial testimony from a surrogate medical
examiner, but the motion did not address the admission of the
forensic autopsy report.389 The prosecution’s predictable position
was that the court should permit the testifying medical examiner, as
an expert witness, to give opinions at trial and rely on materials from
the medical examiner who performed the autopsy.390 The
defendant’s motion was denied.391
The surrogate medical examiner testified that “she had reviewed
‘the autopsy protocol, the toxicology reports, [the] investigator’s
report, and photographs’ that documented [the examining medical
examiner’s] external and internal examinations of the body.”392 The
surrogate also gave opinions as to cause and manner of death.393
At trial, the court admitted the autopsy report into evidence
without objection by the defendant.394 The defendant’s “posttrial
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Banmah v. State, 87 So. 3d 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 103.
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People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570 (Ill. 2012).
Id. at 572.
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Id. at 573.
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Id. at 575.
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motion did not raise any issue in connection with the admission of
the autopsy report itself.”395 However, the defendant did urge error
in allowing the testimony of the surrogate medical examiner.396
The defendant’s post-trial motion was denied.397 On appeal, the
appellate court noted that the defendant did not object to the
introduction of the autopsy report in evidence and did not raise the
issue in the post-trial motion.398 The conviction was affirmed on
appeal.399
As to Crawford,400 the appellate court held that the autopsy
report was a business record and that Crawford instructed that
business records are not testimonial.401 Further, the appellate court
approved an expert’s use of inadmissible evidence to explain the
basis of an opinion as not violative of Crawford.402
The Supreme Court of Illinois determined that it would address
the issue of the admissibility of the forensic autopsy report because
it “implicates a fundamental constitutional right.”403 The court first
determined that the forensic autopsy report was admissible under the
Illinois evidence rules as a business record or a public record.404
Additionally, the forensic autopsy report was admissible pursuant to
a specific Illinois statute providing for admissibility.405
Next, the supreme court undertook an examination of
Crawford,406 Melendez-Diaz,407 Bryant,408 Bullcoming,409 and
Williams.410 It concluded that the forensic autopsy report was not
testimonial.411 The report was “not prepared for the primary purpose
of accusing a targeted individual,” and it was not prepared “for the
primary purpose of providing evidence in a criminal case.”412
Predictably, the court referred to the multiple purposes for which a
forensic autopsy report may be used, concluding that the report is
395.
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“prepared in the normal course of operation of the medical
examiner’s office, to determine the cause and manner of death,
which, if determined to be homicide, could result in charges being
brought.”413 The court then offered a strained analysis suggesting
that:
[T]he autopsy finding of homicide did not directly accuse
defendant. Only when the autopsy findings are viewed in
light of defendant’s own statement to the police is he linked
to the crime. In short, the autopsy sought to determine how
the victim died, not who was responsible, and, thus [the
attending medical examiner] was not defendant’s accuser.414
b. People v. Cortez
Leach followed the opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois for
the First District in People v. Cortez.415 There, the appellate court
held the forensic autopsy report was not testimonial; that it was a
business record; and curiously, that it “was not admitted to establish
or prove some fact at trial and did not lend itself to establishing
defendant’s guilt or innocence,” urging that “[t]he cause and manner
of the victim’s death were not contested.”416 One might legitimately
question the relevance of the forensic autopsy report if it was not
admitted to prove a fact at trial.
c. People v. Brewer
It should be noted that the Appellate Court of Illinois for the
First District recently followed Leach in People v. Brewer.417 Here,
the court emphasized that the autopsy report did not “link[ ] Brewer
to the shooting and it is only when the autopsy findings are viewed
in light of Brewer’s own statement to the police and other evidence
at trial is there a connection established between Brewer and the
crime.”418 Further, the court approved the testimony of the surrogate
medical examiner “‘even if it had the effect of offering the report for
the truth of the matters asserted therein.’”419

413.
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5. Louisiana
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the Second Circuit
considered the admissibility of the forensic autopsy report
(coroner’s report) and the surrogate pathology witness in State v.
Russell.420 Here, the examining coroner died prior to trial.421 The
coroner’s report was admitted into evidence over the defendant’s
objection.422 The surrogate pathologist based his trial opinions in
part on the review of the autopsy report.423 A Louisiana statute
provided that “[a] coroner’s report . . . shall be competent evidence
of death and the cause thereof, but not of any other fact.”424 The
court held that neither proof of death nor cause of death as stated in
a coroner’s report implicates an accused, and therefore, the report
was non-testimonial.425 The court characterized “the information
contained in the report [as] routine, descriptive, nonanalytical, and
thus, nontestimonial in nature.”426 Of course, this characterization
suggests that an autopsy report contains objective data, not subject
to the varying skill and judgment among forensic pathologists, a
characterization that this Article disputes.427 Even without a
reference to Russell, another Louisiana appellate court has recently
maintained this non-testimonial position.428
6. New Jersey
In 2013, a New Jersey appellate court concluded that the
testimony of a surrogate medical examiner in a murder prosecution
was constitutionally permissible.429 The court affirmed the
defendant’s conviction in State v. Bass.430 “An autopsy determined
that the bullet that killed [the victim] had entered through her back
and exited through her chest, passing through her lung and heart.”431
420. State v. Russell, 966 So. 2d 154 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
421. Id. at 159.
422. Id. at 159−60.
423. Id.
424. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 105 (2013); Russell, 966 So. 2d at 163.
425. Russell, 966 So. 2d at 164.
426. Id. at 165.
427. See infra Part V.
428. State v. Francis, No. 12-1221, 2013 WL 1459454 at *2 (La. Ct. App.
2013) (finding no error by lower court for admitting autopsy report over
defendant’s objection because autopsy report did not fall within scope of
Confrontation Clause).
429. State v. Bass, No. 07-12-2903, 2013 WL 1798956, at *20 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Apr. 30, 2013) (per curiam).
430. Id. at *1.
431. Id. at *3.
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The medical examiner who performed the autopsy and prepared the
report died prior to trial.432 The testifying medical examiner did not
participate in the autopsy and, therefore, was a surrogate witness. He
did review the autopsy photographs and report and, at trial,
“concurred with [the attending medical examiner’s] conclusions as
to the cause and manner of . . . death.”433 The “autopsy report was
not admitted into evidence, so . . . findings were only made known
to the jury indirectly through the expert testimony of [the
surrogate].”434
The court noted, having reviewed the relevant Supreme Court
cases, that “[i]t is obvious that the United States Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on these confrontation issues, in the aftermath of
Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams, has been in a state of
considerable flux.”435 Because the autopsy report was not admitted
in evidence, the court did “not reach the controversial question of
whether an autopsy report, by its very nature, is ‘testimonial’ for
purposes of Crawford analysis.”436
The court, however, noted that the surrogate witness
“independently reviewed the evidence, including [the attending
medical examiner’s] findings, to reach his own conclusions.”437 This
position is a bit disingenuous as the surrogate medical examiner
“concurred with [the attending medical examiner’s] conclusions as
to the cause and manner of . . . death.”438 The court, despite having
stated that it need not sound in on the testimonial or non-testimonial
nature of the autopsy report, did just that, holding that the autopsy
report was not “sufficiently ‘formalized’ to be considered
‘testimonial’ under the test expressed in Justice Thomas’s
concurring opinion in Williams.”439 In a footnote, the court also
noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would likely have the
opportunity to resolve this issue.440
7. Ohio
In State v. Craig, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed an
aggravated murder conviction that involved an autopsy performed
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
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before the suspect was arrested.441 The attending medical examiner
retired prior to trial, and a surrogate medical examiner testified at
trial.442 The autopsy report was admitted in evidence.443 Under Ohio
law, the autopsy report was admissible as a public or business
record, and the Supreme Court of Ohio, relying on Crawford,444
held that business records are not testimonial, not having been
prepared for litigation.445
8. South Carolina
In State v. Cutro, the Supreme Court of South Carolina noted
that autopsy reports were excepted from the hearsay rule as public
records.446 It analogized autopsy reports to business records and,
therefore, pursuant to the guidance of Crawford, held that the
autopsy report was not testimonial.447
C. “Hybrid” Jurisdictions
A court’s expression of the practical concern for the potential
exclusion from evidence of the forensic autopsy report when the incourt witness is a surrogate is as follows:
It bears mentioning that the blanket prohibition on the
admission of autopsy reports . . . could result in practical
difficulties for murder prosecutions. If, for example, the
medical examiner who performed the autopsy passes away
before a perpetrator is apprehended and tried, barring the use
in evidence of the autopsy report could, in some situations,
effectively amount to a statute of limitations on murder,
where none otherwise exists.448
In order to combat the problem, an approach has been designed to
permit the admission in evidence of “objective” findings contained
in forensic autopsy reports. The basis of this approach is an
assumption that autopsy findings are objective data as distinguished
from the forensic pathologist’s opinions as to cause of death and
manner of death, both of which require the use of analysis and
judgment. Essentially, the theory is that findings on external and
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio 2006).
Id. at 637.
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Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Craig, 853 N.E.2d at 638–39.
State v. Cutro, 618 S.E.2d 890, 896 (S.C. 2005).
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internal examination of the victim’s body are not judgmental in
nature, are not reliant on the skill of the examining pathologist, and
would be duplicated if other pathologists had the opportunity to
conduct the autopsy. Consequently, this approach concludes that the
objective data—basic anatomical findings—are not testimonial, but
the reporting of cause and manner of death is testimonial.
An example of the hybrid approach is shown in People v. Hall, a
New York case concerning a first-degree murder conviction.449 The
victim’s autopsy was performed (and report prepared) by a medical
examiner who was out of state by the time of trial.450 A surrogate
medical examiner who had reviewed the autopsy report testified at
trial.451 The testifying medical examiner “made some references to
facts contained in the autopsy report, [but] emphasized that all of the
conclusions she reached were her own.”452 The autopsy report was
admitted into evidence in its entirety as a business record.453
The Hall court relied on People v. Freycinet,454 which stands for
the proposition that “the factual part of the [forensic] autopsy report
is nontestimonial and admissible.”455 The Hall court pronounced
that “Melendez-Diaz did not explicitly hold that autopsy reports are
testimonial.”456 This analysis is based on the fact that the medical
examiner is obligated to determine cause of death in circumstances
that may not implicate a crime (e.g., suicide or sudden deaths when
in apparent good health) and that the “factual portions of the autopsy
report consisting primarily of contemporaneous observations and
measurements” record “only what happened to the victim, [and do]
not directly link [a] defendant to the crime.”457 Because the
defendant may cross-examine the surrogate witness as to the
“objective” data in the autopsy report and the surrogate’s “opinions”
are his or her own as opposed to those of the attending pathologist,
use of the surrogate witness does not implicate the Confrontation
Clause.
Maryland has adopted this hybrid approach as well. In Rollins v.
State, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals considered a
conviction for murder and other crimes.458 The defendant was
charged with murder “after . . . [the] autopsy report concluded that
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
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455.
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the cause of death was smothering and the manner of death was
homicide.”459 The forensic autopsy report indicated that the
attending medical examiner was aware of a death investigation.460 A
surrogate medical examiner testified at trial, and her cause of death
opinion was “based on the physical findings in [the attending
medical examiner’s] autopsy report and other information contained
in the file.”461 The trial court redacted from the autopsy report the
opinion of the attending medical examiner “that the manner of death
was homicide by asphyxiation.”462 The remainder of the report was
admitted in evidence, consisting of “routine and objectively
ascertained findings . . . including the documentation of
hemorrhaging to the mouth and other physical conditions of the
victim”463 In a footnote in its opinion, the court referred to three
sections of the autopsy report it believed were “illustrative of the
medical examiner’s findings of the condition of the deceased which
were objectively ascertained, generally reliable, and normally
undisputed: Head[] (Central Nervous System) . . . Cardiovascular
System . . . [and] Respiratory System.”464
The hybrid approach, therefore, spares criminal prosecutions
from potential failure by using a hearsay exception for the admission
of the forensic autopsy report and dissecting from the report the
opinions of the attending pathologist as to cause of death, as it is
only those opinions that have “testimonial” dignity. The surrogate
witness, despite having reviewed the autopsy reports, may then
testify to his or her own opinions as to cause and manner of death
and is subject to cross-examination as to those opinions, thus
avoiding violation of the Confrontation Clause. The surrogate may
testify to “objective data” (pathological findings) contained in the
autopsy report without implicating the Confrontation Clause.
How, then, is this interesting evidentiary issue properly
resolved? Are forensic autopsy reports testimonial, non-testimonial,
or of a hybrid character? The federal courts of appeals and state
courts are simply split. The United States Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the issue. The next Section of this Article argues
that medicine assists in the search for the answer.
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V. THEVERDICT—FORENSIC AUTOPSY REPORTS ARE
“TESTIMONIAL”
At this point, the parameters of the inquiry are well known and
understood as follows:
• A death occurs, possibly due to criminal conduct.
• A crime scene investigation occurs, likely attended by
police and persons employed by the medical examiner or
coroner.
• The victim is taken to the office of the medical examiner
or coroner.
• The medical examiner or coroner receives some
investigatory information, and a pathologist performs a
forensic autopsy.
• Law enforcement personnel are or are not in attendance
at the autopsy.
• The attending forensic pathologist prepares a forensic
autopsy report containing autopsy findings and opinions
on cause and manner of death.
• The criminal defendant has or has not been arrested or
charged by the time of the autopsy.
• The pathologist who performed the autopsy retires, dies,
will not return for trial, or cannot be located and does not
testify at the trial of the accused.
• The criminal prosecution ensues, and a surrogate
pathologist testifies at trial for the prosecution. The
surrogate pathologist has reviewed the forensic autopsy
report, and it forms the basis of the testifying
pathologist’s opinions at trial.
• The forensic autopsy report (or some portion thereof) is
admitted in evidence. At trial, the defendant cannot
confront and cross-examine the pathologist who
performed the autopsy and prepared the report.
• The defendant is convicted.
Also apparent is that courts are concerned with the administration of
criminal justice and that the inadmissibility of forensic autopsy
reports will hamper, if not derail, criminal prosecutions.465
As to the legal analysis, it is clear that a forensic autopsy report,
if offered in evidence at trial for its truth, is classic hearsay. The
report may very well fall within a recognized exception to the
hearsay rule—the business record exception,466 the public record
465. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428, 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
466. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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exception,467 or an exception created by a state-specific statute.468
Further, since Crawford, a well-recognized exception to the hearsay
rule will not trump the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.469
Therefore, the issue is whether forensic autopsy reports are
testimonial.
Medical examiners and coroners perform their duties pursuant to
legal authority and forensic autopsy reports are formal documents.
Forensic autopsies are performed for a number of reasons, not the
least of which is to investigate violent, and likely criminal, deaths.
Forensic pathologists do not perform autopsies in a vacuum in the
absence of some investigatory facts. It is true that the autopsy report
will not typically, if ever, identify the criminal perpetrator. The
forensic pathologist will, nevertheless, know that the details of a
forensic autopsy may constitute evidence in a criminal prosecution.
Forensic autopsy reports do not look like transcripts of in-court
or deposition testimony. They are, however, “official” documents.
The office of the medical examiner or coroner clearly issues the
reports. The attending pathologist then signs and dates the report.
Therefore, they are issued pursuant to appropriate authority for
official purposes, and their use as evidence in a criminal trial is
foreseeable.
It is not necessary to look only to the law as the source of the
formality attributable to forensic autopsy reports or to confirm that
forensic pathologists must anticipate that their work will contribute
to evidence used at a criminal trial. The National Association of
Medical Examiners (NAME), the professional organization for
those “who perform the official duties of the medicolegal
investigation of deaths,”470 has published “Forensic Autopsy
Performance Standards.”471 These standards emphasize the
following:
• “Medicolegal death investigation officers . . . are charged
by statute to investigate deaths deemed to be in the
public interest—serving . . . the criminal justice, civil
justice and public health systems.”472
• “Just as a surgeon does not operate without first
preparing a history and physical examination, so must
the forensic pathologist ascertain enough history and
circumstances . . . to decide whether a forensic autopsy is
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
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indicated and to direct the forensic autopsy toward
relevant case questions.”473
• “The forensic pathologist or representative shall: collect,
package, label, and preserve all evidentiary items” and
“document chain of custody of all evidentiary items.”474
• The need for a formal, written, signed and dated
“postmortem examination report” that will include
observations and descriptions of injuries, a detailed
description of findings, “a list of the diagnoses and
interpretations,” and cause and manner of death.475
Thus, NAME clearly recognizes the formality of the forensic
autopsy report as well as its evidentiary significance. So much for
the argument against forensic autopsy report formality.
The crux of the confrontation issue—the need to confront and
cross-examine the attending forensic pathologist—is that forensic
pathologists are physicians. Physicians exercise judgment and make
mistakes, whether they treat living, breathing patients or perform
forensic autopsies. Courts that have adopted the view that forensic
autopsy reports simply memorialize objective data are misinformed.
Neither forensic pathologists nor forensic autopsy reports are
fungible. Forensic pathologists would not necessarily report the
same findings if each were, hypothetically, able to perform the same
autopsy.
Prior to commenting on the specifics of the judgment of a
forensic pathologist, a few comments on basic, clinical medical
judgment are appropriate and provide some needed context
regarding the role and responsibility of a physician. It has been
urged that “[t]he quality of clinical judgment rendered by an
individual physician who is faced by a patient seeking help is
probably the most important determinant of the quality of the care
he will provide.”476 Physician judgment constitutes one of the
components of “assessment of clinical competence.”477 Clinical
judgment has been defined as:
the totality of the mental processes involved in all stages at
which the clinician collects and interprets data; formulates a
problem statement, confirms and refutes diagnostic
hypotheses; considers, plans, and implements possible
473. Id. at 13.
474. Id. at 25.
475. Id. at 26.
476. John W. Williamson, Assessing Clinical Judgment, 40 J. MED. EDUC. 180,
180 (Feb. 1965).
477. Id.
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diagnostic and therapeutic options, tests, and interventions;
and evaluates likelihoods and outcomes.478
Therefore, there is no underestimation of the significance of clinical
medical judgment. Certainly, lapses in clinical medical judgment
lead to medical errors.
Undoubtedly, clinical medical judgment, and lapses therefore,
may be analogized to forensic pathology. That forensic pathologists
make mistakes is well known to medical literature. In 1956, Moritz
detailed these errors in his work, Classical Mistakes in Forensic
Pathology.479 Among these mistakes, he described the following:
• “Mistakes of Not Being Aware of the Objective of the
Medicolegal Autopsy”;480
• “Mistake of Performing an Incomplete Autopsy”;481
• “Mistakes Resulting from Nonrecognition or
Misinterpretation of Postmortem Changes”;482
• “Mistake of Failing to Make an Adequate Examination
and Description of External Abnormalities”;483
• “Mistake of Confusing the Objective with the Subjective
Sections of the Protocol”;484
• “Mistake of Not Examining the Body at the Scene of the
Crime”;485
• “Mistake of Substituting Intuition for Scientifically
Defensible Interpretation”;486
• “Mistake of Not Making Adequate Photographs of the
Evidence”;487
• “Mistake of Not Exercising Good Judgment in the
Taking or Handling of Specimens for Toxicologic
Examination”;488 and
• “Errors . . . that result in the production of undesirable
artifacts or in the destruction of valid evidence.”489
478. Gilbert M. Goldman, The Tacit Dimension of Clinical Judgment, 63 YALE
J. BIOL. & MED. 47, 48 (1990).
479. Alan R. Moritz, Classical Mistakes in Forensic Pathology, 26 AM. J.
CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 1383 (1956).
480. Id. at 1383.
481. Id. at 1384.
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That these mistakes occur in forensic pathology confirms the
notion that “an autopsy cannot be any better than the understanding
of the person who performs it.”490 “The tragic consequence of a
poorly performed, partial, or superficial autopsy is an unjust or
unrealistic verdict . . . .”491 The forensic pathologist who fails in the
forensic autopsy performance “may well be sowing the seeds of
forensic disaster.”492
The only vehicle by which a criminal defendant may explore the
subjectivity involved in the performance of the forensic autopsy—to
question the judgment of the examining forensic pathologist—is
cross-examination. The in-court testimony of the surrogate forensic
pathologist who examines the autopsy report prepared by the
examining pathologist is an inadequate substitute. The surrogate
witness is not the physician who was required to be familiar with the
facts and the autopsy protocol, examine the victim’s body, perform
the autopsy procedure, make and report findings, and report the
cause and manner of death. The cross-examination of the surrogate
yields very little. The surrogate can rely on the autopsy findings
with impunity. There is simply little to be gained by the defendant in
the effort to cross-examine the surrogate. Cross-examination is the
great truth-seeking test,493 but it is an empty exercise when the
surrogate testifies at trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the United States Supreme Court has addressed the
testimonial nature of certain forensic evidence, it has not addressed
the forensic pathology report. Further, Supreme Court jurisprudence
including and since Crawford494 is ambiguous, confusing, and not
particularly predictive on this point. “Testimonial” statements
include testimony, but that is not a requirement. “Testimonial”
statements suggest statements made with some degree of solemnity,
formality, and authority, but those characteristics are moving targets.
“Testimonial” statements should also have evidentiary
consequences. There should be some understanding (if not
490. Milton Helpern, The Immediate Screening of Deaths and the
Responsibility of Official Pathologists, 47 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 776, 778
(1971).
491. Lester Adelson, The Anatomy of Justice, 47 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 745,
746 (1971).
492. Id.
493. See KENNETH S. BROWN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §19, at 151−52 (7th
ed. 2013); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE’S CODE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
§ 1315, at 259 (3d ed. 1942).
494. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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anticipation) by the declarant that the statement will be used for
evidence at a criminal trial.
The forensic autopsy report qualifies as a testimonial statement.
Forensic pathologists are obligated to perform autopsies in cases of
violent or otherwise criminally caused deaths. Forensic autopsy
reports are formal, legal documents that are prepared pursuant to a
formal protocol. They do not identify the culprit, but they do
formally describe autopsy findings and report the cause and manner
of death. Forensic pathologists are quite aware that their autopsy
reports will be evidentiary and that the testimony of a forensic
pathologist will be sought at trial. Because the examining
pathologist is a physician who exercises judgment throughout the
performance and reporting of the autopsy, the accused must be
entitled to confront and cross-examine the examining forensic
pathologist to test the validity of the autopsy and the pathologist’s
observations, conclusions, and opinions.
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, what remains is a
split of authority in the circuit courts of appeals and the state courts
as to the testimonial nature of the forensic autopsy report. The nontestimonial characterization of the forensic autopsy report is
convenient for the administration of criminal justice and results
when courts do not appreciate the medicine that is at the core of the
forensic autopsy. Medical decision-making and medical judgment
cannot be cross-examined if the examining pathologist is not a
witness at trial. When the examining pathologist is unable to testify
at trial, the inadmissibility of the forensic autopsy report and the
surrogate pathologist’s testimony is the correct price to pay in order
to preserve the protection of the Confrontation Clause.

